I've been doing some work in aesthetics and philosophy of perception lately. So far, I've only been concerned with elementary synthetic a priori judgments concerning colour (visual) and pitch (auditory). I've made some astounding progress so far, but I seem to have hit a wall. Any questions, criticisms, comments, suggestions, etc. are more than welcome. * * * I am considering aesthetics in a very broad sense, defined by Baumgarten as "the science of how things are known via the senses." You can now see how aesthetics relates to the philosophy of perception. Before even dealing with higher-order, compound properties, such as beauty, we must first understand how judgments synthetic a priori, concerning colour and pitch, are possible. There are four forms of judgment that I am interested in, in particular: (1) "Red is closer to purple than blue." (2) "Red and blue go together better than purple and blue." (3) "C is closer to B than F." (4) "C and G go together better than C and D." In predicate logic, where "C" is the "closeness relation" and "T" is the "goes together relation": (1') "rCpb." (2') "rbTpb." (3') "cCbf." (4') "cgTcd." Let's deal with the "closeness relation" first, as in (1) and (3). There is, of course, nothing strictly logical about judgments (1) and (3). Nevertheless, the judgments feel necessary. Hence, I call them synthetic a priori. Since the truth of (1) and (3) have nothing to do with logic, yet are necessary, their necessity must be grounded in the form or structure of colour itself. How is the apprehension of this form or structure possible? To verify (1), I give to myself the colour specturm in representation. I either represent it one-dimensionally, in the form of the visible spectrum, or two-dimensionally, in the form of a colour gradient. In either case, the possibility of such representations is contingent on a pure intution of space, such that I may distinguish between the pure hues and hues which differ even to a very small degree. Without such an intuition, I would not be able to differentiate distinct colours, and I could not judge, e.g. that "This colour is red," pointing to the appropriate place on the spectrum. In the case of (3), however, a different sort of intuition is requisite. While I could represent a C major scale to myself in two-dimensional space, as on a piece of sheet music, I need not do so. The way we write sheet music is merely a convention, and I could easily express the C major scale in one dimension, by assigning the value of middle C to "C0," D to "D0," E to "E0," etc. But even here we should be careful not to confuse the printed signs on the paper with the pitch of C, which is empirical. So, the one-dimensional axis, on which we can give ourselves pitch in representation, is no intuition of space at all but rather a pure intuition of time, which is also one-dimensional. As we distinguish between distinct colours in space, so too do we distinguish between distinct pitches in time. More than one pitch played simultaneously is a chord. * * * This is pretty much where I'm at now. As you can see, there is yet no account of (2) or (4). The trouble is that the pure intuitions of space and time, cannot determine the ordered sequence of colours and pitches because they will "fit" into them in any arbitrary sequence at all. The pure intuitions of space and time are only forms, which cannot determine the content of the spectrum or scale. So, while I am satisfied with my account of the "closeness relation," I have no clue what to do about the "goes together relation." A little help, please?
i feel its the individuals choice to believe in god or not believe in god... either way, it doesn't bother me
I typically hate thread bumping, but this problem is very important to me. I'm also going to make some clarificatory remarks on my last post and some further elucidations. I have said that judgments of the kind (1) through (4) are synthetic a priori. What do I mean by this? Well, one can analyse the concepts of red, purple, and blue, taken individually, as long as one likes, and one will never arrive at (1). The internal relation of one colour to another is not strictly logical, in the way that "P; if P, then Q; therefore, Q," is necessarily derived. In the first place, "P" and "Q" are variables, lacking in content, whereas "red" is a constant and concept. Instead, to arrive at (1), we must give ourselves the visual spectrum in representation, either by use of a prism or in the mind's eye, consciously or subconsciously; and this representation grounds (1). I have said that a pure intuition of space is necessarily antecedent to colour representation. What do I mean by this? It is obvious that one cannot ask, "What colour is this?" without first being able to distinguish between distinct colours, and this act of distinguishing is only possible if the termini of plane figures are given in appearance, that is, if their boundaries in space are evident. The content of one's visual field at any given time is a picture. The pure intuition of space is the form of sensibility. The visible spectrum possesses a certain Gestalt. Remove any part of the spectrum, and the overall effect is lost. While the spectrum feels complete, there are animals, pigeons for example, who see colours that human beings cannot. If our evolutionary history had been different, then we might have been able to see these colours, too. But from where, then, comes this feeling of completeness? The answer to this porblem will be the root of the solution to (2) and (4).
Ok, after a few hours on the net i think i have a reasonable grasp of what your talking about. In answer too your question, from where comes this feeling of completness? I think we feel complete with our visual spectrum because its all we have experienced. I think it is impossible to imagine having a fourth colour receptor like it is impossible to imagine time as a fourth dimention. I spent a while looking at a colour gradient trying to imagine taking a primary out and found it impossible untill i looked at the spectrum as spots of light. I just researched into the way we see colour a little more and found that purple doesnt actually exist. Also there are over 40 times more red and green cones (receptors) in your eye than blue. Im not really sure what result you want but surly the way our eyes work is very important. "Since the truth of (1) and (3) have nothing to do with logic, yet are necessary, their necessity must be grounded in the form or structure of colour itself. How is the apprehension of this form or structure possible?" I dont feel that i fully understand what you are saying here. Where did these truths come from? How do you know they have nothing to do with logic? I would instantly connect the ratio of blue/red cones to the way we interporate what is inbetween. In respect to (2) i would have thought that it is quite possible our brain finds red and blue more pleasing than blue and purple because of the distribution/seperation of cones in our eyes. So, our judgments are synthetic a priori concerning colour because thats the way our eyes interporate colour? Notes obviously work differently to colour as they are an invention of mathmatics.
Your empiricist hypothesis is reasonable, but I think that it fails for a few reasons. Even if I have never seen a certain shade of red, I can abstract from the shades of red that I have seen, and arrive at the missing shade. Colour judgments seem stronger, more necessary, than mere synthetic a posteriori judgments, but we'll get to that later. Yes, considerations from optics are completely revelvant. However, we shouldn't draw unwarranted conclusions from them. Optics doesn't ask questions like, "Does purple exist?" Purple, as a phenomenal object, certainly exists, as it is a necessary component of the spectrum. Similar arguments can be made for the non-existence of black, which is the absence of light. But black, as a phenomenal object, nevertheless exists. Truths of the kind (1) through (4) are grounded in the pure intuitions of space or time, plus something else which I have not yet determined. The intuitions and this third thing, which must be a concept, in sum, will lend such judgments their necessity. This is the form or structure of colour. They cannot be truths of logic, or else the judgments would be analytic and categorical, not synthetic and relational. Our analysis is descriptive psychological, not neuroscientific. A pitch is not a number, even though you might be able to translate a pitch into a number. In any case, a number representing a pitch is not the pitch itself.
I disagree, as we can already see red i think its a terrible example. Please tell me how you could abstract from shades of ultraviolet? Ok i see your problem but i dont think it is possible. Its a result of our visual limitations. There is no phychological reason because the colours work better together before they reach the brain.
You can't abstract from shades of ultraviolet because you can't see shades of ultraviolet. We're talking about colour judgments, concerning the visible spectrum, which are the only kind of colour judgments possible. Yes, it is. That's the form of colour. There are no colours before the brain.
The spectrum feels complete because we can fill in the gaps of what we can see. The gap between red and blue is purple which we have abstracted. In other words our abstraction of red and blue is why the spectrum feels complete. I think i finally understand what you want and I am completely clueless. Please post any progression you have with this problem.
The problem that faces us is "How are colour judgments possible?" We want to know what concepts and intuitions are requisite, in order to make assertions about colour. Judgments are assertions, where speech is internalized. There are two conditions of the possibility of colour judgments: the pure intuition of space, and the concept of colour. I've already spoken a little about the pure intuition of space. Now I need to talk about the concept of colour. It is necessary that all objects in our visual fields be coloured. Even when we close our eyes, the content of our visual field is a black plain. Water is coloured by the colour patches behind it. Therefore, the concept of colour is present to the mind at all times. The predicate "is coloured" is satisfied by "x is red, or x is blue, or x is black, etc." But the concept of colour is a necessary precondition of the representation of any colour at all. From the concept of colour, represented in space, we get the feeling of completeness in the spectrum. The entire spectrum can be abstracted from a relatively small, finite number of particular colour impressions.
