Imagine - A new Constitution

Imagine for a moment, if Obama, the Democrats, and/or the Left including any others who disagree with the adequacy of our Constitution relative to governing today were to write a new Constitution from scratch, and send it to each of the States requiring a 3/4 vote for passage and admittance to the Union, how many States would likely be eager to join the Union and how many would refuse?

Can you imagine what that Constitution would have to contain to satisfy those who would govern? How large a document would result to cover all that government involves itself in or would like to involve itself in? How many freedoms would be eliminated or reduced immediately and how likely would it be that words would be used to allow government to apply greater control and power over the governed in the future as it saw fit, claiming to be for the greater good of the people who are governed?

Although the U.S. Constitution was never presented as a perfect document defining a form of government, it DID set out to allow the people government would be applied to a strong voice in how they would consent to be governed, NOT as a single State, but as a number of sovereign States, containing sovereign self governing individuals, who would cede powers to their local, State, and Federal government through a democratic process allowing the people to be in control and the source of all government powers.

Although lengthy, the following portion of words spoken by George Mason at the Virginia Ratifying Convention in 1788 are quite significant in explaining the difference between governing a free people with their consent versus governing people in supposedly their best interests. As American government
seems to be taught in a greatly different context from what it was when I was schooled more than half a century ago, I wonder if the reasoned words of the founders are given any attention at all in schools today, and if they are in what prospective?

"Mr. Chairman—Whether the Constitution be good or bad, the present clause clearly discovers, that it is a National Government, and no longer a confederation. I mean that clause which gives the first hint of the General Government laying direct taxes. The assumption of this power of laying direct taxes, does of itself, entirely change the confederation of the States into one consolidated Government. This power being at discretion, unconfined, and without any kind of control, must carry every thing before it. The very idea of converting what was formerly confederation, to a consolidated Government, is totally subversive of every principle which has hitherto governed us. This power is calculated to annihilate totally the State Governments. Will the people of this great community submit to be individually taxed by two different and distinct powers? Will they suffer themselves to be doubly harassed? These two concurrent powers cannot exist long together; the one will destroy the other: The General Government being paramount to, and in every respect more powerful than, the State governments, the latter must give way to the former. Is it to be supposed that one National Government will suit so extensive a country, embracing so many climates, and containing inhabitants so very different in manners, habits, and customs? It is ascertained by history, that there never was a Government, over a very extensive country, without destroying the liberties of the people: History also, supported by the opinions of the best writers, shew us, that monarchy may suit a large territory, and despotic Governments ever so extensive t a country; but that popular Governments can only exist in small territories —Is there a single example, on the face of the earth, to support t a contrary opinion? Where is there one exception to this general rule? Was there ever an instance of a general National Government extending over so extensive a country, abounding in such a variety of climates, where the people retained their liberty? I solemnly declare that no man is a greater friend to a firm Union of the American States than I am: But, Sir, if this great end can be obtained without hazarding the rights of the people, why should we recur to such dangerous principles? Requisitions have been often refused, sometimes from an impossibility of complying with them; often from that great variety of circumstances which retard the collection of monies, and, perhaps, sometimes from a willful design of procrastinating. But why shall we give up to the National Government this power, so dangerous in its nature, and for which its members will not have sufficient information—Is it not well known, that what would be a proper tax in one State would be grievous in another? The Gentleman [George Nicholas] who hath favored us with an eulogium in favor of this system, must, after all the encomiums he has been pleased to bestow upon it, acknowledge, that our Federal Representatives must be unacquainted with the situation of their constituents: Sixty-five members cannot possibly know the situation and circumstances of all the inhabitants of this immense continent: When a certain sum comes to be taxed, and the mode of levying to be fixed, they will lay the tax on that article which t will be most productive, and easiest in the collection, without consulting the real circumstances or convenience of a country, with which, in fact, they cannot be sufficiently acquainted. The mode of levying I taxes is of the utmost consequence, and yet here it is to be determined by those who have neither knowledge of our situation, nor a common interest with us, nor a fellow feeling for us:—The subjects of taxation differ in three-fourths; nay, I might say with truth, in four-fifths of the States—If we trust the National Government with an effectual way of raising the necessary sums, ’tis sufficient; every thing we do furtheris trusting the happiness and rights of the people: Why then should we give up this dangerous power of individual taxation? Why leave the manner of laying taxes to those, who in the nature of things, cannot be acquainted with the situation of those on whom they are to impose them, when it can be done by those who are well acquainted with it? If instead of giving this oppressive power, we give them such an effectual alternative as will answer the purpose, without encountering the evil and danger that might arise from it, then I would cheerfully acquiesce: And would it not be far more eligible? I candidly acknowledge the inefficacy of the confederation; but requisitions have been made, which were impossible to be complied with: Requisitions for more gold and silver than were in the United States: If we give the General Government the power of demanding their quotas of the States, with an alternative of laying direct taxes, in case of non compliance, then the mischief would be avoided; and the certainty of this conditional power would, in all human probability, prevent the application, and the sums necessary for the Union would be then laid by the States; by those who know how it can best be raised; by those who have a fellow feeling for us. Give me leave to say, that the same sum raised one way with convenience and ease, would be very oppressive another way: Why then not leave this power to be exercised by those who know the mode most convenient for the inhabitants, and not by those who must necessarily apportion it in such manner as shall be oppressive? With respect to the representation so much applauded, I cannot think it such a full and free one as it is represented; but I must candidly acknowledge, that this defect results from the very nature of the Government. It would be impossible to have a full and adequate representation in the General Government; it would be too expensive and too unwieldy: We are then under the necessity of having this a very inadequate representation: Is this general representation to be compared with the real, actual, substantial representation of the State Legislatures? It cannot bear a comparison. To make representation real and actual, the number of Representatives ought to be adequate; they ought to mix with the people, think as they think, feel as they feel, ought to be perfectly amenable to them, and thoroughly acquainted with their interest and condition: Now these great ingredients are, either not at all, or in so small a degree, to be found in our Federal Representatives, that we have no real, actual, substantial representation; but I acknowledge it results from the nature of the Government: The necessity of this inconvenience may appear a sufficient reason not to argue against it: But, Sir, it clearly shews, that we ought to give power with a sparing hand to a Government thus imperfectly constructed. To a Government, which, in the nature of things, cannot but be defective, no powers ought to be given, but such as are absolutely necessary: There is one thing in it which I conceive to be, extremely dangerous. Gentlemen may talk of public virtue and confidence; we shall be told that the House of Representatives will consist t of the most virtuous men on the Continent, and that in their hands we may trust our dearest rights. This, like all other assemblies, will be composed of some bad and some good men; and considering the natural lust of power so inherent in man, I fear the thirst of power will prevail to oppress the people—What I conceive to be so dangerous, is the provision with respect to the number of Representatives: It does not expressly provide, that we shall have one for every 30,000, but that the number shall not exceed that proportion: The utmost that we can expect (and perhaps that is too much) is, that the present number shall be continued to us—"The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000." Now will not this be complied with, although the present number should never be increased; nay, although it should be decreased? Suppose Congress should say, that we should have one for every 200000, will not the Constitution be complied with? For one for every 200,000 does not exceed one for every 30,000. There is a want of proportion that ought to be strictly guarded against: The worthy Gentleman [George Nicholas] tells us, we have no reason to fear; but I always fear for the rights of the people: I do not pretend to inspiration, but I think, it is apparent as the day, that the members will attend to local partial interests to prevent an augmentation of their number: I know not how they will be chosen, but whatever be the mode of choosing, our present number is but ten: And suppose our State is laid off in ten districts; those Gentlemen who shall be sent from those districts will lessen their own power and influence, in their respective districts, if they increase their number; for the greater the number of men among whom any given quantum of power is divided, the less the power of each individual Thus they will have a local interest to prevent the increase of and perhaps they will lessen their own number: This is evident on the face of the Constitution—so loose an expression ought to be guarded against; for Congress will be clearly within the requisition of the Constitution, although the number of Representatives should always continue what it is now, and the population of the country should increase to an immense number. Nay, they may reduce the number from 65, to one from each State, without violating the Constitution; and thus the number which is now too small would then be infinitely too much so: But my principal objection is, that the confederation is converted to one general consolidated Government, which, from my best judgment of it (and which perhaps will be shewn in the course of this discussion, to be really well founded) is one of the worst curses that can possibly befall a nation. Does any man suppose, that one general National Government can exist in so extensive a country as this? I hope that a Government may be framed which may suit us, by drawing the line between the general and State Governments, and prevent that dangerous clashing of interest and power, which must, as it now stands, terminate in the destruction of one or the other. When we come to the Judiciary, we shall be more convinced, that this Government will terminate in the annihilation of the State Governments: The question then will be, whether a consolidated Government can preserve the freedom, and secure the great rights of the people."

 

I'd support looking at modifying the old, or making a new, constitution.

 

There would be blood.

 

The modification process has always been available to us, but since it requires 3/4 of the States to amend, it is much easier to stack the court with Justices who are willing to find a way to interpret the Constitution in a way that justifies and empowers the actions of the Federal government, without having to have the consent of the governed.

Creating a new Constitution from scratch, in my opinion would likely be an impossible task if the people in 3/4 of the states were required to approve it, and even if 3/4 could be achieved, would force have to be applied to retain the 1/4 of the States where it would not pass?

In either case, is the U.S. Constitution seen as providing too little or too much power to the Federal government, and in what areas should changes be made to improve or modify it?

 

That always remains a possibility.

 

I wouldn't doubt it. I'm sure there's plenty of idiots who would jump to bloodlust if you even mentioned looking at changing the constitution. Change scares people.

 

I hope you never have to vote on such a dangerous proposal. The young guns these days have no clue as to what is going on around them until they step into the shoe worn with experience and knowledge.

Sheep people will be the slaves of their masters of unconsciousness, whom are the corporations.

Too much government control is a bad thing for the People it governs.

 

Rather than bicker over a single Constitution creating two, one by the Left and another by the Right, and allowing a choice as to which you would join would solve any problems that could lead to violence from either side.

 

That would be a good compromise but what of the precedence it sets. I would not trust them to do anything that would take a dime away from them to help human beings.. all of them, both sides.

 

I don't recall a vote being allowed all persons in each of the States, but today there are probably a great many more issues dividing us than there were then.

 

I've been saying for years that America is too big and should be completely restructured. If my opinion matters, which it doesn't, I think America should be broken into regional provinces with our current constitution still providing a basic framework for laws in each province. Anything not specifically defined in the constitution would be determined by each province. Things like money and defense would be a federal thing. That's basically how this country was intended to work with states' rights except I think it would work better with five or six provinces rather than 50 states.

 

Which is a major problem being they are given powers to represent us and once in a position where they are capable of exercising the powers given them they more often than not, disregard the voice of those who elected them in favor of those who funded their campaign. Originally, the House members were tasked more directly with representation of the people, and the Senate members more closely to the State as a whole.

Article V defines how the Constitution amendment process can be employed, and I'm sure if really wanted, an amendment could be proposed to allow the creating of a new or choice from one of several new Constitutions to be possible if enough States were to ratify it.

What I was suggesting is rather than begin by trying to achieve compromise in the creation of a single Constitution, two or more groups selected by the people could try and produce examples for the people to look at and compare and then see if or where compromises might be possible in bringing the people together under a single Constitution, and if not allow separation to occur in order to retain the peace.

 

I think most would be open to changing it. The potential for violence would increase when what form that change would take.

For example, I am totally open to the idea of constitutional reform. However, I would fight hard (to include violence) to ensure that certain ideas (like many you hold) would never be included in such a reform.

 

Well, I think money will always be needed to run a campaign, but it would be nice if election funding was used to assure that all candidates got equal exposure where the people and not the parties or funding of one candidate gave them an edge over better but less visible candidates.

On the Constitution, I would suggest that the people would be given opportunity to have their voices heard whenever compromises took place to assure the final result was more representative of their desires by a large majority.

That's a good question, but I don't think any new Constitution proposal would contain the reinstitution of slavery.

 

Would everyone be receptive if each article required acceptance by the 3/4 of the voting age population in 3/4 of the States to make it binding upon all 50 of the States? Obviously there is no way to gain 100% acceptance of either a States population or the States in compromises.

 

I think such popular voting opens a dangerous door, man. And one not so easily shut ag

 

I don't think I'd be onboard with that either. I think that if this course is ever undertaken allowances need to be made for states/regions to leave the resulting union